written by Vittoria Patti | edited by Leander Zillich | fact-checked by Tanzir Ahmed

According to the United States Institute for Peace, Myanmar is now “ the country with the longest-running violent conflict in the world.” With thousands of people killed and thousands more displaced, the civil war has caused an unmeasurable amount of suffering. There are many factors that play a significant part in the continuation of the fighting. In this essay, however, I will focus on the role of the political system because I believe that it is essential to understand this element in order to tackle the roots of the violence. I will analyze the issues with the current hybrid political order in Myanmar and explore the suggestions of think tanks and scholars to deal with this unique structure. First, I will give a brief historical context and introduce the multiple actors involved, showing the great hybridity that characterizes this state – a concept referring to the interplay of different entities in the governance of a country. Second, I will delve deeper into the problems that Myanmar has been facing under this type of rule. Finally, I will present possible ways to address such a crisis based on the ongoing debate of policy advisors and academia. 

After the end of the British colonial rule in 1948, Myanmar has seen a troubled political history. In fact, the parliamentary democracy established following its independence lasted less than 15 years. After two coups, a new constitution was created, which gave the military extensive control of government and made it impossible to change it without its approval. Therefore, following a slow transition back into civilian rule and a promising democratic election in 2015, the state fell into the hands of the military once again in February 2021 and has been in a brutal civil war ever since. In an article published by the Council on Foreign Relations that overviews both the historical and present situation, Lindsay Maizland cites her colleague Joshua Kurlantz’s definition of Myanmar as a “ failing state.” However, many contemporary authors in the field have called this approach reductive. In the Berghof Handbook Dialogue, Volker Boege et al. suggest that “ rather than thinking in terms of fragile or failed states, it might be theoretically and practically more fruitful to think in terms of hybrid political orders.” They thus argue that it was more productive to look at certain countries as having an alternative state model where different entities contribute to the governance of the territory. Similarly, in her article on the Journal of Political Power, Jenny Pearce questions the traditional Weberian model of state and instead explores the workings of the “ alternative configurations of power and politics at play in different regions of the world.” Although her discussion is mostly built around the role of organized crime, she points out that the dynamics she explores can be found in a variety of places where non-state actors are involved in the power relations of the country. 

However, even if we are looking at Myanmar through this framework, the country seems to have an “unusual” hybrid political order, where the state is not merely sharing power with another group; rather, it is a melting pot of different actors. Indeed, there are two national governments in action in Myanmar: the official one, led by the military junta (also known as the Tatmadaw), and a parallel counter-part named the National Unity Government (abbreviated NUG), which has its own army in the People’s Defense Force. The former is led by General Min Aung Hlaing, although recent defeats have put his leadership at risk, and the latter is marked by the influence of now-arrested Aung San Suu Kyi, the previous de facto head of the state. Moreover, there are more than a dozen armed ethnic groups, some with their own administrative bodies, as well as smaller militias of citizens. These actors have different goals and therefore often clash with each other. For example, when the ethnic armed groups work together – such as in the Three Brotherhood Alliance – they aim to retain control of a specific territory and administrate its resources, yet they have no interest in ruling the entire country. They also collaborate with the NUG, which was formed with the precise purpose of taking back the country’s government. On the other hand, both these forces serve as a strong opposition to the Tatmadaw, to the point where they have collectively pushed the military junta to the center of Myanmar whilst managing to maintain autonomy in the periphery. Unsurprisingly, this highly complex political order inevitably calls for many issues. 

The presence of a hybrid political system and the absence of an exclusive authority inevitably has direct and indirect consequences for the country. Together, these hinder its development. One of the most pressing issues is the economic crisis that Myanmar has been facing for decades. This crisis arises from the isolationist policy and the socialist model implemented by the first military regime of General Ne Win, which have taken a great toll on the population, with high rates of poverty prevailing in most rural areas. Already with the second military regime, and later with the democratic government, reforms were introduced aimed at opening up the economy to foreign investment and reducing the country’s reliance on China. However, due to constant instability, many issues persisted. In an article on Conflict, Security and Development, Jason Miklian highlights how Myanmar has been “ permeated by endemic corruption at the individual, institutional and political levels,” which has prevented the flourishing of businesses. The few achievements that were made in terms of economic development have been tested during the COVID-19 pandemic and reversed after the recent coup. Since then, no real improvement has happened under the current hybrid order. 

In addition, the economic changes of the past did not help with fostering peace, but in many cases further exacerbated tensions in the population, calling attention to the long-standing issue of ethnic discrimination in Myanmar. There are more than one hundred ethnicities in the country, with a majority of Burmans; in this context, the minorities often suffer from disparities and repression. After the reforms, the unequal distribution of the new opportunities led to “ grievances resulting from social, political and economic deprivation,” causing more conflict among groups. Moreover, the military has continued to perpetrate ethnic violence, since elites were the main beneficiaries of personal enrichment. A clear example is the genocide of the Rohingya Muslim minority that started in 2016. Despite recent attempts to pacify disputes between the state and marginalized communities, “ the coup ended the shaky peace process that the Suu Kyi government started between the central government and armed ethnic organizations,” blocking any future hope for a peaceful settlement in the contemporary political order. 

Looking at the conflict in Myanmar, it is immediately evident that there is no clear-cut path to end the war. There has been an active discussion in the field of conflict analysis on the best way forward, especially investigating what role international actors should play in this framework. A report of the International Crisis Group on the matter outlines a specific policy recommendation, based on the assumption that “ Myanmar is likely to be fragmented for the foreseeable future.” They separate the actors between two types: neighbors and donors. Countries in the same geographical area, such as China and Thailand, should “ engage with non-state authorities,” recognizing the subnational entities that dominate the borders, even if they constitute the less traditional part of the hybrid political order. So far, although China has interacted with some of these groups in the past, none have been officially recognized. In fact, “ Beijing [has] eventually [given] the military leader de facto recognition” and is competing with Russia to exert influence on the junta, which is also supported by Bangkok. A challenge pointed out by the report is that neighboring states will be reluctant to affiliate themselves with alternative groups as “ they worry about the precedent they might be setting, given that several are contending with their own insurgent or separatist groups.” On the other hand, the International Crisis Group argues that donors such as countries and multinational institutions should simultaneously contribute to reinforce the power of the armed groups in control with a flexible aid response, to “ provide them […] with appropriate assistance, to address humanitarian needs as well as support improving governance.” For example, zooming in on the United States, although the U.S. Congress has taken steps to urge the imposition of sanctions on the Tatmadaw and the legitimization of the NUG, “ activists and analysts say Washington could do more,” which is in line with what the report of the International Crisis Group prescribes. 

Some scholars in the field have taken this approach one step further. Another strategy advocates for aiding non-state groups as well; yet, rather than seeking to improve the current hybrid political order, this is pursued with the aim of eventually fostering a change of regime where federalism could become the official governing system. In the Contemporary Southeast Asia journal, Ashley South states that “ to support and sustain this emergent, bottom-up federalism in Myanmar, renewed attention must be paid to building up the Ethnic Armed Organizations’ […] administrative capacities as well as their political credibility ” with international donors playing a crucial part in this. However, she admits that, although such a policy would be helpful as a good starting point and is a necessary preceding condition, solid change in the system would eventually require a transformation at the higher core of the state – a different constitution.  

Similarly, Jeremy Webber in the International Journal of Constitutional Law highlights the potential strengths of federalism as an effective way to bridge the differences found within hybrid states. He claims that such a system “ can accommodate, within a stable political order, very different conceptions of nationhood, claims of self-determination, and foundations for the legitimacy of a country’s political structures.” The diversity of communities, institutions, cultures and traditions in Myanmar make it the ideal place for such a reform to be implemented, with a focus on creating a constitutional framework that can adequately support the hybrid character of society. Federalism is the structure that will “ enable political collaboration where it might otherwise be impossible.” Fundamentally, both the perspectives of South and Webber stand in opposition with that of the International Crisis Group, which instead explicitly claims that “ central state structures and institutions […], even if federal in intent, are unlikely to gain traction.” 

The intricate web of military, civilian, and ethnic players that makes up the political order of Myanmar requires developing new techniques of state building that depart from the traditional and Western-shaped methods. I have explored two different proposals of how global engagement could address the issues embedded in Myanmar’s socio-political context, which have worsened under its current hybrid political order. But what does this mean for the future of the country? In fact, either solution comes with an important caveat that cannot be ignored: they both entail increased dependence on the decisions of outside actors to step in and support either entity, both financially and politically, which might further delay or complicate the road to stability.  

Based on the arguments that they put forward, I support the policy of the International Crisis Group as a short-term strategy because I agree with the claim that local structures of authority should be empowered over the current martial rule. However, I believe that South and Webber’s recommendations would be more efficient on a long-term scale. In order to put a definitive end to violence, the ultimate goal should be to foster a transition to federalism. It is inevitable that the hybridity that characterizes Myanmar’s political order will remain even if a new government emerges. Therefore, the focus should be on supporting a system of governance that can provide an effective institutional foundation under which the hybrid political order functions more effectively. Upon investigating the role of international actors, the next steps in research should focus on the role of domestic actors and analyze how they can contribute to tackle the problems from the inside and promote external collaboration to ultimately bring peace in Myanmar. 

Vittoria Patti is a master student of Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University. After obtaining her bachelor in the U.S., she now focuses on transatlantic affairs, international law and global security.